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Using  panel  micro  data  obtained  from  merging  several  waves  of  Community 
Innovation Survey in the Czech Republic, Norway and the United Kingdom, we 
estimate dynamic random effects tobit models, in which the innovation output 
given by sales of innovative products is the function of the cooperative behaviour 
of firms and their other observed characteristics, while accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results indicate that the capacity of firms to build on external 
domestic linkages is what matters most for the innovation output. And that foreign 
external linkages lead to superior innovation performance only in combination 
with  the  domestic  ones.  Also  the  results  suggest  that  the  positive  effect  of 
domestic cooperation is driven by linkages to education, research and scientific 
institutions,  even  though  these  types  of  partners  tend  to  be  used  by  firms 
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Traditionally, because of data availability, dynamic panel data analyses of innovation focused 
on the relationship between R&D and patents in the framework of knowledge production 
function on one hand and the effects of R&D and/or patents on performance of firms on the 
other hand (Mairrese and Mohnen 2010). But R&D (and innovation) may be conducted in 
many ways  and with  different  productivity in  terms  of firm’s performance. For  example, 
innovation projects could be conducted jointly with other organizations. Does this make a 
difference for the returns of firms on their innovation activity? Are cooperative projects more 
productive in generating new products and sales thereof? And what kind of partners is the 
most productive in this respect? 
 
Over  the  last  two  decades  the  Community  Innovation  Survey  (CIS)  has  been  conducted 
regularly in many countries offering new evidence of the innovative behaviour of firms. But 
so far the vast majority of empirical research on cooperation in the innovation process has 
relied on cross-sectional evidence (Srholec 2010), which leaves us in the dark with regards to 
the dynamic aspects of innovation. Since these surveys are conducted quad-annually and bi-
annually in the recent years, and the early (pilot) surveys are not fully compatible with the 
recent evidence, only now relevant panel datasets become to emerge that allow researchers to 
study longitudinal evidence based on these surveys in an econometric framework.  
 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  however,  only  Raymond,  et  al.  (2009)  provides  dynamic 
evidence on the link between innovation inputs, outputs and the performance of firms that 
takes  into  account  the  cooperative  behaviour  of  firms.  Yet  they  used  only  the  overall 
cooperation variable, without considering the heterogeneity of partners by location or type, 
and  included  this  variable  in  the  current  period,  not  examining  the  lagged  effects  of 
cooperation  in  the  panel  estimate.  Although  they  did  not  even  report  the  effects  of  this 
variable, which hence did not merit much of their attention, they comment in the paper on the 
fact that those firms that cooperate incur larger R&D or total innovation expenditures and that 
there are similarly significant results for the innovation output. 
  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by examining the dynamic relationship 
between cooperative behaviour of firms and productivity of the innovation process given by 
sales of innovative products. Using an unbalanced panel of micro data from several waves of 
CIS in the Czech Republic, Norway and the United Kingdom, we estimate dynamic random 
effects tobit models, in which the innovation output of firms is the function of cooperation 
variables  and  other  observed  characteristics  of  firms,  while  accounting  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity. Section 2 presents the panel data. Section 3 outlines the model and debates the 
econometric  strategy.  Section  4  gives  results  of  the  econometric  estimates.  Section  5 
concludes the paper with policy implications. 3 
 
2. Overview of the dataset 
 
The empirical analysis is based on panel data at the firm level obtained from merging several 
waves of CIS conducted by national statistical offices in the Czech Republic, Norway and the 
United Kingdom, namely the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO), Statistics Norway (SSB) and 
the Office of National Statists (ONS). Following the Oslo Manual (OECD 1997 and 2005) a 
harmonized methodology has been used to collect the data. Yet there are several differences 
in how the respective countries implement the survey and changes of the methodology over 
time that need to kept in mind when handling the data.  
 
CIS by default collects data only for firms with 10 and more employees. But the data are 
collected on the base of a sample survey in the United Kingdom, while a combination of a 
sample survey of small firms (from 10 to 249 employees) and a census of large firms (with at 
least  250  employees)  is  used  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Norway.  A  random  sampling 
stratified by industry, size categories and more recently by NUTS3 regions is used in the 
sample  surveys.  Answering  the  questionnaire  is  compulsory  in  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Norway, but voluntary in the United Kingdom. Hence, the response rate edged up to 95% in 
Norway, oscillated between 60 to 80% in the Czech Republic, and increased from around 40 
to  60%  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Obviously,  this  has  consequences  for  the  potential  for 
creating a panel dataset. 
 
Table 1 provides overview of the data. To create a panel dataset we merged four consecutive 
waves  of  CIS  in  each  country.  CISw1,  CISw2,  CISw3  and  CISw4  shortcuts  indicate  the 
respective wave of the survey.
1 CIS has a three-year reference period.
2 Even though there is 
one-year overlap between some of the  consecutive periods, this does not pose a problem in 
this paper, because as further explained below the dependent variable refers to outcomes in 
the final year of the period, i.e. the reference periods of lagged predictors and the dependent 
variable do not overlap with each other. 
 
                                                 
1  Earlier  surveys  conducted  in  Norway  and  the  United  Kingdom,  i.e.  the  so-called  CIS1,  provide  data  not 
sufficiently compatible with the subsequent evidence to be included in the panel. Unfortunately, data from the 
latest CIS2006-2008 in Norway and the United Kingdom had not been disseminated for research purposes before 
this analysis has been conducted. CIS1 and CIS2, i.e. with reference periods in the nineties, were not conducted 
in the Czech Republic. 
2 CISw2 in the Czech Republic is the  only exception with two-year reference period over 2002-2003, but this 
should not lead to a serious bias here, because the dependent variable refers to innovative sales in the final year. 4 
 
Table 1: Overview of the CIS data 
 
Wave 
Reference period  Number of observations 
Czech 
Republic  Norway  United 
Kingdom 
Czech 
Republic  Norway  United 
Kingdom 
CISw1  1999-2001*  1995-1997*  1994-1996  2,841  2,933  2,109 
CISw2  2002-2003*  1999-2001*  1998-2000  3,495  3,438  6,184 
CISw3  2004-2006*  2002-2004*  2002-2004  6,235  3,732  4,906 
CISw4  2006-2008*  2004-2006  2004-2006  6,583  5,120  4,876 
 
Note: * The questionnaire was filtered for INNACT=0 firms. 
 
 
CIS  in  the  earlier  periods  focused  primarily  on  gathering  data  on  industrial  enterprises 
(10-41), whereas the coverage of firms operating in market services (50-74) has improved 
only gradually over time. Some sectors have been covered erratically and therefore for the 
sake of harmonization excluded from the sample, namely the sectors of construction (45), 
repair, wholesale and retail trade (50-52) and hotels and restaurants (55).  NACE, rev. 1.1 
codes are denoted in the brackets. Because of the combined effect of extending the sectoral 
coverage  and  the  general  trend  of  improving  response  rates,  the  number  of  observations 
available for creating the panel dataset tends to increase over time.  
 
Nevertheless,  as  a  consequence  of  the  random  stratified  sampling,  i.e.  of  the  fact  that  a 
somewhat different pool of respondents is drawn from the targeted population in each wave of 
the survey, a certain proportion of the firms appears in the data only once, and therefore 
cannot be used in the dynamic analysis. Table 2 reveals the longitudinal distribution of the 
data.
3 From this follows that an unbalanced panel, which includes firms that are present in at 
least two consecutive surveys, covers about 2 9%, 34% and 46% of the firms in the Czech 
Republic, Norway and the United Kingdom, respectively. Note that in the l atter country the 
last survey has been deliberately designed to collect data for the same firms that answered the 




                                                 
3 In the first column of the table, this is depicted by a string of “0” for being missing and “1” for being present in 
the respective period; hence, for example, “1111” denotes that the firm appears in all four waves of the survey, 
whereas “0011” means that there is data for the given firm in the last two periods, and “0001” means that the 
firm is observed only at one point in time. 
4 For confidentiality reasons, 36 firms in the United Kingdom must be reported together in the “undisclosed” 
category.  5 
 
Table 2: Longitudinal pattern of the data 
 
Pattern 
Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
Firms  %  Firms  %  Firms  % 
1111  644  5.11  639  6.88  47  0.39 
0111  596  4.72  649  6.99  322  2.66 
0011  1,497  11.87  823  8.86  4421  36.54 
1011  182  1.44  117  1.26  53  0.44 
1110  105  0.83  195  2.10  n.a.  n.a. 
0110  241  1.91  304  3.27  n.a.  n.a. 
1101  97  0.77  61  0.66  n.a.  n.a. 
1100  292  2.31  387  4.17  661  5.46 
0101  256  2.03  200  2.15  n.a.  n.a. 
1001  196  1.55  117  1.26  n.a.  n.a. 
1010  165  1.31  144  1.55  n.a.  n.a. 
1000  1,160  9.20  1,273  13.71  1347  11.13 
0100  1,264  10.02  1,003  10.80  5151  42.58 
0010  2,805  22.24  861  9.27  60  0.50 
0001  3,115  24.69  2,514  27.07  n.a.  n.a. 
Undisclosed  0  0  0  0  36  0.30 
Total  12,615  100.00  9,287  100.00  12,098  100.00 
 
 
Table 3 provides definitions of the variables. TURNINN is the measure of innovation output, 
which refers to the proportion of products that were innovated over the reference period in 
total turnover in the final year of the reference period. At the centre of our interest are the CO 
variables for cooperation, which are derived from the set of questions on whether the firm 
cooperated  on  innovation  with  other  organizations  over  the  reference  period.  Firms  were 
asked to report the location and type of the partner. As far as the location is concerned, firms 
reported whether the partner was domestic or foreign, from which we derive the “dom” and 
“for”  abbreviations.  Several  types  of  the  partner  organisation  have  been  distinguished, 
including  other  firms  within  the  respondent’s  group,  suppliers,  customers,  competitors, 
commercial  labs,  universities  and  public  research  institutes.  From  this  follows  the  basic 
distinction between internal cooperation with other members of the group denoted by “GP” 
and external cooperation with the other types of organizations not affiliated to the group given 




Table 3: Definition of the variables  
 
TURNINN  Sales of innovated products as the proportion of total turnover 
COforEXT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm has a cooperation arrangement on 
innovation with a foreign non-affiliated partner 
COdomEXT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm has a cooperation arrangement on 
innovation with a domestic non-affiliated partner  
COforGP  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group and cooperates 
on innovation with a foreign member of the group 
COdomGP  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group and cooperates 
on innovation with a domestic member of the group 
GPnonCO  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group but does not 
cooperate on innovation with the group members 
R&DIN  Intramural R&D expenditure as % of turnover 
R&DEX  Extramural R&D expenditure as % of turnover 
MAC  Acquisition of machinery and equipment specifically purchased for the purpose 
of innovation as % of turnover 
ROEK  Acquisition of other external knowledge specifically purchased for the purpose 
of innovation as % of turnover 
PAT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm applies for a patent 
EXPORT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm exports 
SIZE  Log of employment 
HT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in 
a high-tech (HT) manufacturing sector according to OECD (2003, pg. 156) 
MHT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in 
a medium-high-tech (MHT) manufacturing sector according to OECD (2003, 
pg. 156) 
MLT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in 
a medium-low-tech (MLT) manufacturing sector according to OECD (2003, 
pg. 156) 
LT  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in 
a low-tech (LT) manufacturing sector according to OECD (2003, pg. 156) 
KIS  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in 
a sector of knowledge-intensive services (KIS) according to OECD (2003, pg. 
140) 
OTH  Dummy variable with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified in  
other (OTH) residual sector not covered by OECD (2003, pg. 140 and 156) 
 
 
Hence, there are four dummy variables COforEXT, COdomEXT, COforGP and COdomGP 
for the respective location and type of partners. In addition, because so many cooperating 
firms  engage  simultaneously  with  foreign  and  domestic  partners,  we  create  from  these 
variables  three  mutually  exclusive  categories  of  firms  that  either  cooperated  only  with 
partners abroad, only with partners at home or with both of them; these are delineated in the 
following econometric analysis by two more sets of shortcuts CObothEXT, COforEXTonly, 
COdomEXTonly for the external partners and CObothGP, COforGPonly, COdomGPonly for 7 
 
the within group cooperation. Finally, GPnonCO denotes the residual category of firms that 
are affiliated to a group but do not cooperate on innovation with the other members.
 5  
 
In addition, there is a battery of variables that account for resources, capabilities and structural 
features  of  the  firms.  R&DIN,  R&DEX,  MAC  and  ROEK  stand  for  the  intensity  of  the 
innovation process on different inputs given by the amount of expenditure on the respective 
innovation activity as the percentage of turnover in the final year of the reference period. To 
curtail the influence of outliers, we exclude from the sample firms that reported more than 
25% intensity on any of these variables.
6 PAT represents the appropriability conditions of the 
firms’  knowledge  base  given  by  the  fact  whether  the  firm  applied  for  a  patent  over  the 
reference period. SIZE and EXPORT account for the structural features, namely the size of 
the firm represented by log of employment in  the final  year  and the exposure to foreign 
markets given by the fact whether the firm exports.
 7  
 
Finally,  we  control  for  broad  sectoral  differences  by  dummy  variables  derived  from  the 
classification of firms in six groups of sectors following the OECD taxonomy of industries 
based on technology. In the manufacturing sector this taxonomy distinguishes between the so-
called  high-tech,  medium-high-tech,  medium-low-tech  and  low-tech  industries 
(Hatzichronoglou 1997, OECD 2003, pp. 140 and 156), denoted by the HT, MHT, MLT and 
LT shortcuts. Only relatively recently this taxonomy has been extended to the service sector 
by including the category of so-called knowledge-intensive services, which is denoted by the 
KIS dummy, and which covers the sectors of post and telecommunications (64), finance and 
insurance (65-67) and the other business activities excluding real estate and renting (72-74); 
NACE, rev. 1.1 codes are in the brackets. OTH refers to the mixed bag of other residual 
sectors not covered above, such as mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply and 
transport.  
 
Yet there is one more difference in how the data is collected that needs to be explained. Oslo 
Manual (OECD 1997 and 2005) defines the category of “innovation active” firms as those 
that responded positively at least to one of the questions asking them whether they introduced 
a  new  product,  a  new  process  and  whether  they  had  not  yet  completed  (ongoing)  or 
abandoned innovation activities. Accordingly, the harmonized CIS questionnaire devised by 
Eurostat uses this distinction to filter the way how the respondents are expected to fill in the 
survey, so only the “innovation active” firms are asked to report details on their innovation 
activity regarding the types of innovation expenditure, cooperation on innovation, etc. In other 
words, firms that do not report to innovate, not even claim to have ongoing or abandoned 
efforts, do not answer the more detailed questions.  
 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, the GPnonCO variable lumps together firms affiliated to a group with headquarters in the same 
country and abroad, because the location of headquarters is not possible to distinguish in the early surveys 
conducted in Norway and the United Kingdom. 
6 In fact, these extreme values were in many cases  mere measurement errors caused by the fact that the firm 
mistakenly answered the question on turnover in thousand s of the local currency units, but the questions on 
innovation expenditures in the  full  amount, generating exceptionally high ratio s  between them. Also th ese 
indicators are defined in terms of turnover, so the intensity in terms of value added is much higher, and therefore 
generally not feasible beyond this threshold, except perhaps of special circumstances, which are not the concern 
of this paper. 
7 It should be noted that definition of the EXPORT dummy has changed over time from the question on whether 
“the firm’s most significant market is international with a distance of more than 50 km” used in (CIS3 and the 
earlier) surveys with reference periods ending before 2002 to the question whether “the firm sells goods or 
services to foreign markets” used in the more recent (CIS4 and later) surveys. 8 
 
But not every statistical office follows the suit. Table 1 indicates with the asterisk, which of 
the surveys  in  fact adopted this  recommendation.  None of the questionnaires  used in  the 
United Kingdom did resort to the filtering. And in Norway this is the case of the last version 
of the questionnaire. As a result, in about half of the surveys we have non-filtered data, but in 
the other half there is missing information on the more detailed questions for those firms that 
have been spared from answering them. How should we harmonize this? Since the firms that 
declared not having any innovation activity whatsoever, logically could not have reported a 
positive number on these missing figures, we impute zeros to these firms in the variables 
affected by the filtering. Alternatively, we could refrain from inferring the zeros and focus on 
the (persistently) innovation active firms  only.  But this  would lead to  a potential sample 
selection  bias,  which  is  quite  computationally  burdensome  to  handle  in  the  panel  data 
framework.  
 
Table 4 compares averages of the variables in the total pooled dataset and the unbalanced 
panel  that  is  available  for  the  econometric  estimates.  After  omitting  observations  with 
incomplete  records  and  with  the  excessive  (more  than  25%)  intensity  on  the  innovation 
expenditure  variables,  we  arrive  to  an  unbalanced  panel  of  3,079  firms  with  8,218 
observations in the Czech Republic, 2,905 firms with 7,986 observations in Norway and 5,013 
firms  with  10,550  observations  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Hence,  the  individual  firms  on 
average appear in the sample 2.67, 2.75 and 2.10 times in the respective countries out of the 
maximum of four periods. To a large extent the unbalanced sample accords with the overall 
dataset  in  the  United  Kingdom,  while  there  is  a  certain  bias  in  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Norway. Because the data for large firms are collected by census in these countries, which 
naturally boosts their chances to appear in the sample repeatedly, there is a bias in the size of 
firms. And this is reflected in differences in the other variables, because large firms are known 
to have higher propensity to be innovation active, and therefore to cooperate on innovation, 
etc. 
8 Nevertheless, the sectoral composition appears very similar, so there is not a bias along 
these lines.  
 
 
                                                 
8  Also  this  explains  why  the  unbalanced  panel  consists  of  noticeably  more  cooperative  firms  in  the  Czech 
Republic and Norway than in the United Kingdom, even though there is a relatively small difference in the 
overall sample. 9 
 
Table 4: Averages of the variable in the total sample and the unbalanced panel  
 
  Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
   Total  Unbalanced 
panel  Total  Unbalanced 
panel  Total  Unbalanced 
panel 
TURNINN  0.085  0.109  0.080  0.089  0.101  0.107 
COforEXT  0.092  0.144  0.111  0.146  0.075  0.080 
COdomEXT  0.144  0.218  0.179  0.225  0.135  0.152 
COforGP  0.046  0.076  0.054  0.074  0.045  0.048 
COdomGP   0.036  0.058  0.061  0.076  0.055  0.067 
GPnonCO   0.253  0.328  0.465  0.510  0.434  0.369 
R&DIN  0.004  0.013  0.011  0.026  0.005  0.006 
R&DEX  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.005  0.001  0.001 
MAC   0.007  0.017  0.004  0.007  0.011  0.014 
ROEK  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.019  0.001  0.001 
PAT  0.035  0.059  0.081  0.114  0.172  0.229 
EXPORT   0.382  0.467  0.498  0.562  0.442  0.464 
SIZE  4.328  5.078  3.820  4.183  4.169  4.288 
HT  0.051  0.057  0.036  0.046  0.061  0.056 
MHT  0.167  0.202  0.111  0.124  0.127  0.123 
MLT  0.145  0.133  0.174  0.177  0.134  0.136 
LT  0.222  0.194  0.289  0.271  0.209  0.200 
KIS  0.240  0.226  0.191  0.186  0.292  0.313 
OTH  0.175  0.188  0.209  0.197  0.177  0.172 
Num. of obs.  16,013  8,218  9,357  7,986  16,131  10,550 
Num. of firms  10,713  3,079  6,437  2,905  11,314  5,013 
 
Note: Number of observations available in the total sample differs by variable due to item non-response. 
 
 
Table 5  presents more  detailed  descriptive overview of  the variables in  the form  as  they 
appear in the econometric estimates, i.e. the dependent variable TURNINN is reported in the 
current period and the predictors are lagged by one period, including the lagged dependent 
variable. Sectoral classification of the firms is fixed over time, and therefore not reported in 
the table. For the purpose of this study the most important insight here is the dynamics of 
these variables. Between standard deviation refers to the variation “between” firms in a given 
period, while within standard deviation is the variation “within” the same firm over time. 
Most of the variables show noticeably higher variation between firms than within them over 
time; suggesting that there is a great deal of persistence.
9 Now the question is whether there 
are statistically significant relationships between these patterns. More specifically, our aim  is 
to find out whether firms that cooperated on innovation tend to be more productive in terms of 
innovative sales in the next period.  
 
                                                 
9 Since the scope for variation over time increases with the number of periods, the within variation appears 
particularly low in the United Kingdom, because for the majority of firms in this panel there is data only from 
the last two surveys. Note that the overall standard deviation of dummy variables is determined by the mean, 
though for completeness' sake we report both of these statistics. 10 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the unbalanced panel data 
 
   Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
  Mean  Overall  Between  Within  Mean  Overall  Between  Within  Mean  Overall  Between  Within 
      st. dev.  st. dev.  st. dev.     st. dev.  st. dev.  st. dev.     st. dev.  st. dev.  st. dev. 
TURNINN  0.111  0.214  0.197  0.104  0.079  0.173  0.159  0.085  0.088  0.204  0.199  0.043 
TURNINNt-1  0.107  0.208  0.195  0.102  0.095  0.197  0.182  0.098  0.126  0.247  0.246  0.045 
COforEXT t-1  0.170  0.375  0.314  0.198  0.151  0.358  0.320  0.145  0.082  0.275  0.267  0.064 
COdomEXT t-1  0.250  0.433  0.376  0.213  0.223  0.417  0.368  0.212  0.161  0.367  0.359  0.088 
o/w CObothEXTt-1  0.122  0.327  0.272  0.187  0.138  0.345  0.294  0.187  0.072  0.258  0.251  0.061 
       COforEXTonlyt-1  0.017  0.130  0.109  0.080  0.019  0.138  0.113  0.087  0.010  0.101  0.096  0.031 
       COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.092  0.289  0.250  0.162  0.090  0.286  0.244  0.172  0.089  0.284  0.279  0.073 
COforGP t-1  0.090  0.286  0.238  0.146  0.076  0.265  0.228  0.109  0.048  0.214  0.204  0.054 
COdomGP t-1  0.070  0.255  0.207  0.133  0.072  0.259  0.218  0.146  0.069  0.253  0.247  0.061 
o/w CObothGP t-1  0.014  0.118  0.096  0.074  0.023  0.151  0.123  0.088  0.019  0.137  0.130  0.040 
       COforGPonly t-1  0.056  0.230  0.194  0.124  0.058  0.234  0.185  0.133  0.029  0.168  0.160  0.044 
       COdomGPonly t-1  0.040  0.195  0.162  0.108  0.053  0.224  0.189  0.133  0.049  0.217  0.213  0.051 
GPnonCO t-1  0.324  0.468  0.430  0.212  0.518  0.500  0.461  0.240  0.340  0.474  0.461  0.111 
R&DIN t-1  0.006  0.021  0.022  0.008  0.014  0.036  0.036  0.013  0.006  0.021  0.021  0.004 
R&DEX t-1  0.001  0.007  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.013  0.011  0.007  0.001  0.007  0.007  0.001 
MAC t-1  0.008  0.025  0.024  0.013  0.005  0.020  0.018  0.011  0.013  0.032  0.031  0.007 
ROEK t-1  0.001  0.007  0.006  0.004  0.001  0.009  0.009  0.004  0.001  0.007  0.006  0.002 
PATt-1  0.064  0.245  0.196  0.127  0.116  0.320  0.280  0.152  0.215  0.411  0.405  0.089 
EXPORT t-1  0.529  0.499  0.479  0.184  0.580  0.494  0.469  0.203  0.449  0.497  0.494  0.073 
SIZE t-1  5.160  1.397  1.383  0.155  4.252  1.204  1.190  0.204  4.290  1.517  1.490  0.085 
Number of obs.  4,750  4,666  5,328 
Number of firms  3,079  2,905  5,013 
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3. Econometric model 
The aim is to investigate the effect of past cooperative behaviour in the innovation process on 
the current innovation output. For this purpose the econometric model predicts the innovation 
output of firms as follows: 
 
TURNINNit = ʱTURNINNit-1 + βCOit-1 + γxi + δi + εit 
 
where i is a firm and t is time, so the current innovation output (TURNINNit) is the function 
of the past innovation output (TURNINNit-1), past cooperation on innovation (COit-1), other 
observable characteristics of the firm (xi), unobserved individual effects (δi) and other time-
variant unobserved variables (εit). Since the model is estimated exclusively at the micro level, 
for the sake of brevity we do not use i to indicate the firm in the following. Because the 
dependent variable is truncated between 0 and 1, we use the maximum likelihood procedure 
to estimate tobit model, and because the number of periods in the sample is rather limited (and 
therefore some of the key predictors are time-invariant for many firms), we estimate random 
effects model. 
 
A positive and statistically significant estimate of ʱ indicates the persistence of innovation 
output. But the focal interest of this study is in the estimate of β, which indicates the effect of 
lagged cooperation on the innovation output. Besides these predictors, however, there are 
other  characteristics  which  boost  the  innovative  performance  of  firms.  If  these  other 
observables are persistent over time, they induce persistence in the innovation output. Hence, 
it is essential to control for as many as possible of them. If in addition these characteristics are 
unobserved, such as the entrepreneurial spirit, latent capabilities or risk profiles of firms, and 
therefore not controlled for in the estimates, the variables of interest may seem to determine 
current innovation output because of picking up the effect of these persistent unobserved 
attributes. Hence, it is important to account for these effects in the estimates with the help of 
dynamic panel data analysis. 
 
It should be noted, however, that we do not tackle the potential problem of initial conditions 
described by Heckman (1981) that besets estimating dynamic non-linear models. Wooldridge 
(2005) proposed and Peters (2009) and Raymond, et al. (2009, 2010) implemented in the 
context of research on innovation what they call the “simple solution” of this problem. Peters 
(2009) and Raymond, et al (2010) detected significant effects of the initial conditions, while 
Raymond, et al. (2009) found a rather small bias. Unfortunately, the initial conditions problem 
could not be considered in this paper, because a major limitation of this solution is that this 
procedure has been developed for balanced panels. Since a majority of the firms are observed 
only in two consecutive periods, this solution is not suitable for us here, as for too many of 
them the initial condition is identical to the lagged period. Hence, the initial conditions are 
assumed to be exogenous in the following. 12 
 
4. Econometric results 
 
TURNINNt is the dependent variable. On the right-hand side, the lagged dependent variable 
TURNINNt-1  accounts  for  the  persistence  of  innovation  output  and  the  square  term 
TURNINNsquaret-1 is included to control for non-linearity of this effect because of the upper 
boundary that cannot trespassed by definition of the variable. COt-1 is the main predictor (or a 
vector) of our interest. More specifically, COt-1 refers to the set of lagged dummy variables 
for location and type of partners for cooperation on innovation COforEXT t-1, COdomEXT t-1, 
COforGP t-1 and COdomGP t-1 and their combinations outlined above. Furthermore, the model 
accounts for a vector of the other observed predictors x, namely a set of lagged firm-level 
characteristics GPnonCOt-1, R&DIN t-1, R&DEX t-1, MAC t-1, ROEK t-1, PAT t-1, EXPORT t-1 
and SIZE t-1, a battery of sector dummies HT, MHT, MLT, LT, KIS and OTH in the current 
period, where the latter is the base category, and a set of time dummies to control for cross-
sectional  dependence.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  estimates  do  not  suffer  from  a  serious 
problem of multicollinearity, because these predictors are not excessively correlated to each 
other. 
 
First, we present estimates of the model on the full sample of firms,  which provides the 
benchmark results. And then we look more closely at differences by size categories of firms 
by estimating the model separately for small, medium and large firms. To make easier the 
analysis of national differences, we report results of the same model by country with the 
Czech Republic in  the  first,  Norway in the second and the United Kingdom  in  the third 
column  of  the  regression  tables.
10  Marginal effects  for the  expected value of the  (latent) 
dependent variable  (unconditional on the censoring)  are  reported, i.e.  E(y*),  where  y* = 
max(a, min(y,b)), a is the lower limit for  left censoring and b is the upper limit for right 
censoring;  covariates  are  fixed at their means .
11  Stata 11 has been used to perform the 
estimates.  
 
Table  6  gives  the  first  set  of  results.  Since  the  estimated  effects  of   TURNINNt-1  and 
TURNINNsquaret-1 come out positive and highly statistically significant, the results indicate 
persistence  of  innovation  output  and  confirm  the  non-linearity  of  this  relationship. 
Admittedly, this is in line with expectations given the strategic nature of the decision of firms 
to innovate and given the fact that other existing papers on this topic based on the CIS data 




                                                 
10 Since the confidential micro data from the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom could have been accessed 
only in the premises of the respective national statistical offices, and prohibited to take out from the terminal, we 
could not merge the national datasets together in order to perform the estimates on a combined cross-country 
sample. 
11 Just as there are three expected values of tobit, i.e.  the probability of being uncensored, the expected value of 
the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored  and the unconditional expected value of the dependent 
variable, there are three corresponding marginal effects that can be possibly reported. But for the sake of space, 
only the latter marginal effects are reported, because these combine the other two, and therefore  their values 
naturally lie in between of them. Results of the other marginal effects are available from the author upon request.  13 
 
Table 6: Tobit results for level of TURNINN 
 
  Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
TURNINN t-1  0.368  (0.035)***  0.258  (0.026)***  0.350  (0.026)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.303  (0.040)***  -0.182  (0.030)***  -0.260  (0.029)*** 
COforEXTt-1  0.002  (0.009)  0.007  (0.007)  -0.005  (0.009) 
COdomEXTt-1  0.028  (0.008)***  0.013  (0.006)**  0.021  (0.008)** 
COforGP t-1  0.015  (0.010)  -0.012  (0.008)  0.005  (0.011) 
COdomGP t-1  0.019  (0.010)*  0.002  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.009) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.025  (0.006)***  0.003  (0.004)  0.006  (0.005) 
R&DIN t-1  0.632  (0.108)***  0.452  (0.055)***  0.479  (0.090)*** 
R&DEX t-1  0.304  (0.291)  -0.209  (0.136)  0.139  (0.255) 
MAC t-1  0.162  (0.093)*  0.161  (0.084)*  0.148  (0.062)** 
ROEK t-1  0.395  (0.325)  -0.375  (0.203)*  -0.019  (0.289) 
PATt-1  0.019  (0.009)**  0.024  (0.006)***  0.022  (0.006)*** 
EXPORT t-1  0.004  (0.006)  0.028  (0.004)***  0.027  (0.005)*** 
SIZE t-1  0.018  (0.002)***  0.004  (0.002)**  0.003  (0.002)* 
CISw3  0.043  (0.006)***  -0.016  (0.005)***  0.086  (0.018)*** 
CISw4  0.010  (0.006)*  -0.017  (0.005)***  0.025  (0.006)*** 
HT  0.091  (0.012)***  0.077  (0.010)***  0.066  (0.016)*** 
MHT  0.082  (0.009)***  0.072  (0.007)***  0.043  (0.011)*** 
MLT  0.063  (0.010)***  0.043  (0.007)***  0.036  (0.011)*** 
LT  0.061  (0.009)***  0.048  (0.006)***  0.040  (0.009)*** 
KIS  0.066  (0.009)***  0.061  (0.007)***  0.022  (0.008)*** 
Number of observations  4,750  4,666  5,328 
Number of firms  3,079  2,905  5,013 
σ (e)  0.349  (0.010)***  0.315  (0.006)***  0.469  (0.023)*** 
Wald 
2  855.29  1043.47  804.87 
Log-likelihood  -2,204.287  3,798.430  -2,482.114 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
More interesting, at least for us, is the estimated effect of cooperative behaviour of firms. 
Somewhat surprisingly, only the COdomEXTt-1 dummy for the occurrence of cooperation on 
innovation with external (not being part of the group) domestic partners comes out highly 
statistically significant. And this is the case in all three countries. Other modes of cooperation 
do not seem to make much difference in the innovation output; only perhaps except of within 
the group in the Czech Republic, which appears weakly significant at 10 and 15% for the 
domestic and foreign partners, respectively. As far as the magnitude of the marginal effects is 
concerned, firms that forge cooperation links in the innovation process with external domestic 
partners are estimated to gain by 1.3 to 2.8 percentage points higher proportion of innovative 
sales. At the first glance, this might not seem much; however, one needs to compare this to 
the sample mean reported above, which ranges from 7.9 to 11.1 percent of the total turnover. 
So the effect actually indicates increase of this proportion by roughly one fourth to one sixth 
depending on the country, and this is arguably a sizeable boost to the innovative performance 
of the firm.  
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Results of the other observed predictors that are not the main concern of this paper are largely 
according to the expectations. R&DIN t-1 has highly significant effect, MAC t-1 contributes a 
bit too, but external sourcing of knowledge – ceteris paribus – represented by R&DEX t-1 and 
ROEK  t-1 does not make a significant difference. Appropriability conditions of the firm’s 
knowledge based given by the PATt-1 dummy promote the innovation output. SIZE  t-1 and 
EXPORT t-1 are relevant control variables, except of the Czech Republic, where the latter is 
not statistically significant, perhaps because most firms in this country have not started to 
compete on the base of innovation on foreign markets so far, and therefore the supposed 
learning-by-export  effect  does  not  materialize  here.  Another  result  in  which  the  Czech 
Republic  stands  out  is  the  positive  and  highly  significant  effect  of  GPnonCO  t-1  which 
probably reflects the fact that in less advanced countries affiliated firms, in particular foreign 
affiliates,  tend  to  relatively  more  depend  on  straightforward  technology  transfer  from  the 
parent company that does not entail mutual cooperation on developing this technology. 
 
To help us understand what is behind these results of the cooperation variables, particularly 
with the foreign partners, which is the focal point of this analysis, we repeat the estimate by 
using the mutually exclusive categories of CObothEXT, COforEXTonly, COdomEXTonly for 
the  external  partners  and  CObothGP,  COforGPonly,  COdomGPonly  for  the  within  group 
cooperation.  Because  so  many  cooperating  firms  engage  simultaneously  with  foreign  and 
domestic partners (Srholec 2010), which somewhat blurs this distinction, we generate these 
exclusive categories in order to zoom on those that cooperate only with partners abroad on 
one hand or only at home on the other hand.  
 
Table 7 shows the results. First, the exclusively external domestic cooperation is the only 
category that comes out statistically significant at conventional levels across the board, albeit 
only weakly in Norway. So the capacity to build on domestic linkages is what matters most 
for  the  innovation  output.  Second,  cooperation  on  innovation  jointly  with  domestic  and 
foreign  partners,  in  other  words  combining  local  and  global  linkages,  leads  to  superior 
innovation performance too, especially in small and open Czech and Norwegian economies, 
but  turns  out  to  be  statistically  significant  only  at  15%  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Third, 
however, the exclusively external foreign cooperation is clearly the weakest strategy with 
insignificant effects in Norway and the United Kingdom and a relatively large standard error 
of the estimated effect in the Czech Republic. Hence, the solely foreign orientation does not 
seem to pay off. And the cooperative linkages within the group only matter to some extent in 
the Czech Republic. Overall, the marginal effects suggest that there seems to be much closer 
connection between cooperation on innovation and the output of the innovation process in the 




Table 7: Tobit results for level of TURNINN 
 
  Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
TURNINN t-1  0.366  (0.035)***  0.259  (0.026)***  0.349  (0.026)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.301  (0.040)***  -0.183  (0.030)***  -0.259  (0.029)*** 
CObothEXTt-1  0.029  (0.009)***  0.020  (0.006)***  0.016  (0.011) 
COforEXTonlyt-1  0.030  (0.017)*  0.005  (0.012)  0.001  (0.019) 
COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.035  (0.008)***  0.012  (0.007)*  0.025  (0.009)*** 
CObothGP t-1  0.034  (0.019)*  -0.013  (0.012)  0.013  (0.017) 
COforGPonly t-1  0.013  (0.011)  -0.009  (0.009)  -0.004  (0.012) 
COdomGPonly t-1  0.020  (0.012)  0.006  (0.009)  -0.008  (0.010) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.026  (0.006)***  0.003  (0.004)  0.005  (0.005) 
R&DIN t-1  0.623  (0.108)***  0.453  (0.055)***  0.484  (0.090)*** 
R&DEX t-1  0.314  (0.290)  -0.216  (0.137)  0.155  (0.255) 
MAC t-1  0.160  (0.093)*  0.161  (0.084)*  0.147  (0.062)** 
ROEK t-1  0.398  (0.325)  -0.374  (0.204)*  -0.037  (0.289) 
PATt-1  0.019  (0.009)**  0.024  (0.006)***  0.022  (0.006)*** 
EXPORT t-1  0.005  (0.006)  0.028  (0.004)***  0.027  (0.005)*** 
SIZE t-1  0.018  (0.002)***  0.004  (0.002)**  0.003  (0.002)* 
CISw3  0.044  (0.006)***  -0.016  (0.005)***  0.086  (0.018)*** 
CISw4  0.011  (0.006)*  -0.017  (0.005)***  0.025  (0.006)*** 
HT  0.090  (0.012)***  0.077  (0.010)***  0.066  (0.016)*** 
MHT  0.081  (0.009)***  0.072  (0.007)***  0.043  (0.011)*** 
MLT  0.063  (0.010)***  0.043  (0.007)***  0.036  (0.011)*** 
LT  0.061  (0.009)***  0.048  (0.006)***  0.040  (0.009)*** 
KIS  0.066  (0.009)***  0.061  (0.007)***  0.021  (0.008)*** 
Number of observations  4,750  4,666  5,328 
Number of firms  3,079  2,905  5,013 
σ (e)  0.350  (0.010)***  0.315  (0.006)***  0.468  (0.023)*** 
Wald 
2  858.50  1,043.97  806.15 
Log-likelihood  -2,202.391  2,754.570  -2,481.208 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
Furthermore,  we  test  for  the  possibility  that  the  external  and  within  group  cooperative 
linkages  interact  with,  i.e.  complement  or  substitute,  each  other  in  their  effects  on  the 
innovation output. In other words, for example, we consider the thesis that benefits from 
foreign external linkages are reinforced by cooperative innovation networks within the group 
or vice-a-versa. Table 8 gives results of this exercise. Some of the interaction terms appear 
weakly  significant,  but  there  generally  does  not  seem  to  be  a  credible  support  for  the 
connection  between  within  group  and  external  linkages  –  positive  nor  negative  –  which 
suggests that these networks tend to operate somewhat separately, at least as far as their 
output in terms of innovative sales is concerned. Arguably, this possibly points to the fact that 
firms fail to capitalize on the opportunity for cross-fertilization of knowledge available in the 




Table 8: Tobit results for level of TURNINN 
 
  Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
TURNINN t-1  0.366  (0.035)***  0.260  (0.026)***  0.351  (0.026)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.301  (0.040)***  -0.184  (0.030)***  -0.261  (0.029)*** 
CObothEXTt-1  0.032  (0.010)***  0.024  (0.007)***  0.012  (0.014) 
* CObothGP t-1  0.035  (0.020)*  -0.021  (0.013)  0.021  (0.022) 
* COforGPonly t-1  -0.001  (0.015)  -0.017  (0.011)  -0.004  (0.017) 
* COdomGPonly t-1  0.016  (0.017)  -0.001  (0.012)  -0.001  (0.020) 
COforEXTonlyt-1  0.030  (0.022)  0.015  (0.017)  0.011  (0.026) 
* CObothGP t-1  0.000  (0.000)  0.038  (0.061)  -0.012  (0.099) 
* COforGPonly t-1  0.010  (0.032)  -0.041  (0.025)*  -0.024  (0.029) 
* COdomGPonly t-1  0.033  (0.080)  0.013  (0.042)  -0.027  (0.041) 
COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.036  (0.009)***  0.007  (0.007)  0.026  (0.010)** 
* CObothGP t-1  -0.012  (0.052)  -0.041  (0.039)  -0.022  (0.028) 
* COforGPonly t-1  0.017  (0.023)  0.006  (0.018)  0.002  (0.028) 
* COdomGPonly t-1  0.008  (0.019)  0.023  (0.014)*  -0.009  (0.012) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.024  (0.006)***  0.003  (0.004)  0.005  (0.005) 
R&DIN t-1  0.616  (0.108)***  0.446  (0.055)***  0.482  (0.090)*** 
R&DEX t-1  0.328  (0.291)  -0.212  (0.137)  0.152  (0.256) 
MAC t-1  0.157  (0.093)*  0.150  (0.084)*  0.146  (0.062)** 
ROEK t-1  0.416  (0.324)  -0.378  (0.203)*  -0.036  (0.289) 
PATt-1  0.018  (0.009)**  0.024  (0.006)***  0.021  (0.006)*** 
EXPORT t-1  0.005  (0.006)  0.028  (0.004)***  0.027  (0.005)*** 
SIZE t-1  0.018  (0.002)***  0.004  (0.002)**  0.003  (0.002)* 
CISw3  0.044  (0.006)***  -0.016  (0.005)***  0.086  (0.018)*** 
CISw4  0.011  (0.006)*  -0.017  (0.005)***  0.025  (0.006)*** 
HT  0.091  (0.012)***  0.077  (0.010)***  0.067  (0.016)*** 
MHT  0.082  (0.009)***  0.072  (0.007)***  0.043  (0.011)*** 
MLT  0.063  (0.063)***  0.044  (0.007)***  0.036  (0.011)*** 
LT  0.061  (0.061)***  0.048  (0.006)***  0.040  (0.009)*** 
KIS  0.066  (0.066)***  0.061  (0.007)***  0.021  (0.008)*** 
Number of observations  4,750  4,666  5,328 
Number of firms  3,079  2,905  5,013 
σ (e)  0.350  (0.010)***  0.315  (0.006)***  0.468  (0.023)*** 
Wald 
2  856.76  1,051.77  806.72 
Log-likelihood  -2,202.723  2,236.889  -2,480.567 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
As  already  noted  above,  the  surveys  allow  us  to  further  distinguish  several  types  of  the 
external partners for cooperation, which can help us to shed more light on what is behind the 
results presented above. From this follow the shortcuts SUP for suppliers, CUS for customers, 
COM for competitors, and SCI for the combined category of commercial labs, universities 
and public research institutes; note that we combine the latter three categories, because these 
cooperation partners are relatively rare and because they frequently appear together. Table 9 
presents the results. For the sake of space, we do not use the mutually exclusive, i.e. foreign 
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Table 9: Tobit results for level of TURNINN by the type of CO partner 
 
  Czech Republic  Norway  United Kingdom 
TURNINN t-1  0.378  (0.035)***  0.262  (0.026)***  0.350  (0.026)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.315  (0.040)***  -0.185  (0.030)***  -0.260  (0.029)*** 
COforSUPt-1  -0.006  (0.010)  0.007  (0.007)  -0.009  (0.010) 
COforCUSt-1  0.005  (0.010)  -0.002  (0.007)  -0.005  (0.010) 
COforCOMt-1  -0.017  (0.012)  0.005  (0.008)  0.011  (0.015) 
COforSCIt-1  0.006  (0.012)  -0.001  (0.008)  -0.004  (0.013) 
COdomSUPt-1  0.005  (0.009)  -0.002  (0.006)  -0.005  (0.009) 
COdomCUSt-1  0.005  (0.010)  0.006  (0.007)  0.018  (0.011)* 
COdomCOMt-1  -0.006  (0.011)  0.004  (0.008)  0.011  (0.011) 
COdomSCIt-1  0.030  (0.008)***  0.011  (0.006)*  0.011  (0.009) 
COforGP t-1  0.018  (0.010)*  -0.012  (0.007)  0.007  (0.012) 
COdomGP t-1  0.019  (0.011)*  0.003  (0.007)  -0.005  (0.009) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.024  (0.006)***  0.003  (0.004)  0.006  (0.005) 
R&DIN t-1  0.629  (0.109)***  0.457  (0.055)***  0.481  (0.091)*** 
R&DEX t-1  0.305  (0.291)  -0.211  (0.137)  0.134  (0.255) 
MAC t-1  0.171  (0.093)*  0.165  (0.084)**  0.156  (0.062)** 
ROEK t-1  0.417  (0.326)  -0.375  (0.204)*  -0.025  (0.290) 
PATt-1  0.018  (0.009)**  0.024  (0.006)***  0.022  (0.006)*** 
EXPORT t-1  0.004  (0.006)  0.028  (0.004)***  0.027  (0.005)*** 
SIZE t-1  0.018  (0.002)***  0.004  (0.002)**  0.003  (0.002)* 
CISw3  0.043  (0.006)***  -0.016  (0.005)***  0.085  (0.018)*** 
CISw4  0.012  (0.006)*  -0.018  (0.005)***  0.024  (0.006)*** 
HT  0.092  (0.012)***  0.077  (0.010)***  0.067  (0.016)*** 
MHT  0.082  (0.010)***  0.072  (0.007)***  0.044  (0.011)*** 
MLT  0.063  (0.010)***  0.043  (0.007)***  0.036  (0.011)*** 
LT  0.062  (0.009)***  0.047  (0.006)***  0.040  (0.009)*** 
KIS  0.067  (0.009)***  0.061  (0.007)***  0.021  (0.008)*** 
Number of observations  4,750  4,666  5,328 
Number of firms  3,079  2,905  5,013 
σ (e)  0.349  (0.010)***  0.315  (0.006)***  0.466  (0.023)*** 
Wald 
2  861.40  1,044.41  806.87 
Log-likelihood  -2,202.752  2,480.994  -2,480.048 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
only,  domestic  only  or  both,  categories  of  cooperation  by  location,  because  this  would 
generate fairly long list of the cooperation variables in this estimate. The main outcome is that 
the positive effect of domestic external cooperation is driven by the education, research and 
scientific – in other words non-market – institutions in the Czech Republic and to a lesser 
extent in Norway and the United Kingdom and in addition by the customers and competitors 
in the United Kingdom. Even though firms cooperate on innovation with the SCI category of 
partners more rarely than say with their suppliers and customers, which is a well-known fact 
in the existing literature on this topic (Srholec 2010), these partners appear to be particularly 
valuable for boosting the innovation output. Admittedly, this finding is encouraging for the 
literature in the tradition of Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) that puts emphasis on the role 18 
 
of  industry-university  relations  in  the  innovation  process  of  firms.  Again,  none  of  the 
variables of foreign external cooperation did come out even close to be statistically significant 
at conventional levels.  
 
So far we have not discussed the unobserved effects. At the bottom of the tables is reported 
the estimated parameter σ(e), which indicates the variance attributed to the panel-level (i.e. 
firm-level) component. If this is close to zero, the unobserved firm-level characteristics do not 
account for the outcome. Since σ(e) has come out highly significantly different from zero in 
each of the estimates performed so far, the results indicate that indeed the unobserved effects 
are very important to control for in the dynamic panel data framework, because if not, the 
variables of interest may pick up the effect of these attributes. 
 
Next, we test robustness of the results by estimating the model separately for three broad size 
categories of small (0-49 employees), medium (50-249 employees) and large (more than 250 
employees) firms. As also already explained above, these surveys are based on a stratified 
sample in the United Kingdom but on the combination of a stratified sample of small firms 
(from 10 to 249 employees) and a census of large firms (with at least 250 employees) in the 
Czech Republic and Norway. As a consequence, in the latter countries large firms have higher 
likelihood to appear in the sample repeatedly, and in turn for them the panel data is noticeably 
more “balanced”. So besides testing sensitivity of the results to size of the firm, this reveals 
the extent to which quality of the panel data influences the estimated coefficients, which is a 
valuable insight in its own right.  
 
Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 show the results. The main outcome is that CObothEXTt-1 and 
COdomEXTonlyt-1, i.e. domestic external linkages in combination with the foreign ones or 
without, matter most for the innovation output of large firms. In other words, the key findings 
highlighted above hold predominantly for the large firms. To a certain extent this is also the 
case of medium firms, although the effects are much less significant, except only of the Czech 
Republic. But small firms seem to operate quite differently in this respect, and there does not 
seem  to  be  a  clear  pattern  across  countries.  For  the  small  firms  none of  the  cooperation 
variables  came  out  statistically  significant  in  the  Czech  Republic,  only  COforEXTonlyt-1 
appears relevant in Norway and only COdomGPonly t-1 contributes in the United Kingdom. It 
remains an open question, however, whether this is a real phenomenon or whether this is 
rather the artefact of more “unbalanced” panels for small firms.  
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Table 10.1: Tobit results for level of TURNINN by size categories, Czech Republic 
 
  Small  Medium  Large 
TURNINN t-1  0.364  (0.067)***  0.380  (0.058)***  0.341  (0.057)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.332  (0.078)***  -0.317  (0.072)***  -0.269  (0.062)*** 
CObothEXTt-1  -0.005  (0.025)  0.042  (0.016)***  0.029  (0.013)** 
COforEXTonlyt-1  0.044  (0.039)  0.015  (0.033)  0.030  (0.024) 
COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.006  (0.018)  0.039  (0.014)***  0.037  (0.013)*** 
CObothGP t-1  0.000  (0.000)  -0.007  (0.036)  0.057  (0.026)** 
COforGPonly t-1  0.019  (0.031)  0.003  (0.022)  0.018  (0.016) 
COdomGPonly t-1  -0.025  (0.040)  0.033  (0.022)  0.017  (0.018) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.022  (0.011)**  0.033  (0.009)***  0.024  (0.009)** 
R&DIN t-1  0.132  (0.160)  0.390  (0.142)***  1.109  (0.249)*** 
R&DEX t-1  0.374  (0.723)  0.219  (0.373)  0.573  (0.536) 
MAC t-1  0.185  (0.158)  0.312  (0.150)**  -0.034  (0.156) 
ROEK t-1  0.442  (0.377)  0.127  (0.702)  0.389  (0.581) 
PATt-1  0.050  (0.029)*  0.031  (0.020)  0.020  (0.013) 
EXPORT t-1  -0.002  (0.010)  0.011  (0.009)  0.000  (0.011) 
SIZE t-1  0.007  (0.009)  0.029  (0.009)***  0.025  (0.006)*** 
CISw3  0.009  (0.013)  0.025  (0.012)**  0.067  (0.009)*** 
CISw4  -0.006  (0.012)  -0.004  (0.011)  0.028  (0.010)*** 
HT  0.054  (0.020)***  0.078  (0.018)***  0.124  (0.023)*** 
MHT  0.042  (0.014)***  0.090  (0.015)***  0.108  (0.017)*** 
MLT  -0.008  (0.025)  0.046  (0.016)***  0.097  (0.017)*** 
LT  0.030  (0.015)**  0.035  (0.015)**  0.100  (0.016)*** 
KIS  0.033  (0.012)***  0.065  (0.013)***  0.079  (0.020)*** 
Number of observations  943  1,530  2,277 
Number of firms  802  1,190  1,220 
σ (e)  0.492  (0.029)***  0.448  (0.017)***  0.286  (0.010)*** 
Wald 
2  100.27  270.12  337.98 
Log-likelihood  -394.968  -726.783  -994.467 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 10.2: Tobit results for level of TURNINN by size categories, Norway 
 
  Small  Medium  Large 
TURNINN t-1  0.263  (0.044)***  0.249  (0.039)***  0.264  (0.072)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.177  (0.050)***  -0.185  (0.042)***  -0.196  (0.083)** 
CObothEXTt-1  0.010  (0.012)  0.014  (0.008)*  0.053  (0.017)*** 
COforEXTonlyt-1  0.051  (0.025)**  -0.013  (0.016)  0.016  (0.029) 
COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.017  (0.012)  -0.005  (0.009)  0.042  (0.016)*** 
CObothGP t-1  -0.048  (0.039)  0.016  (0.017)  -0.032  (0.025) 
COforGPonly t-1  -0.020  (0.019)  0.006  (0.011)  -0.028  (0.022) 
COdomGPonly t-1  0.010  (0.018)  -0.006  (0.011)  0.029  (0.022) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.005  (0.007)  -0.002  (0.006)  0.027  (0.017) 
R&DIN t-1  0.426  (0.078)***  0.482  (0.092)***  0.066  (0.216) 
R&DEX t-1  -0.158  (0.194)  -0.427  (0.237)*  0.421  (0.393) 
MAC t-1  0.177  (0.139)  0.175  (0.116)  0.090  (0.233) 
ROEK t-1  -0.639  (0.319)**  -0.118  (0.261)  -1.585  (1.072) 
PATt-1  0.024  (0.011)**  0.027  (0.007)***  0.034  (0.013)** 
EXPORT t-1  0.034  (0.007)***  0.028  (0.006)***  0.013  (0.012) 
SIZE t-1  0.007  (0.007)  0.001  (0.006)  -0.011  (0.008) 
CISw3  -0.026  (0.009)***  -0.011  (0.006)*  -0.017  (0.012) 
CISw4  -0.018  (0.008)**  -0.020  (0.006)***  -0.011  (0.013) 
HT  0.094  (0.016)***  0.046  (0.015)***  0.138  (0.025)*** 
MHT  0.081  (0.013)***  0.058  (0.010)***  0.101  (0.019)*** 
MLT  0.053  (0.013)***  0.025  (0.009)***  0.083  (0.016)*** 
LT  0.047  (0.013)***  0.035  (0.008)***  0.085  (0.015)*** 
KIS  0.076  (0.013)***  0.033  (0.010)***  0.103  (0.016)*** 
Number of observations  1,765  2,213  688 
Number of firms  1,402  1,306  399 
σ (e)  0.370  (0.013)***  0.290  (0.011)***  0.258  (0.011)*** 
Wald 
2  409.09  431.45  195.05 
Log-likelihood  2,250.528  -781.122  475.361 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 
standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 10.2: Tobit results for level of TURNINN by size categories, United Kingdom 
 
  Small  Medium  Large 
TURNINN t-1  0.300  (0.036)***  0.382  (0.050)***  0.435  (0.055)*** 
TURNINNsquare t-1  -0.225  (0.040)***  -0.266  (0.056)***  -0.340  (0.063)*** 
CObothEXTt-1  0.018  (0.018)  0.010  (0.020)  0.015  (0.020) 
COforEXTonlyt-1  0.018  (0.036)  -0.005  (0.034)  -0.014  (0.029) 
COdomEXTonlyt-1  0.018  (0.013)  0.026  (0.017)  0.035  (0.021)* 
CObothGP t-1  -0.003  (0.034)  0.013  (0.036)  0.024  (0.029) 
COforGPonly t-1  -0.008  (0.022)  0.017  (0.029)  -0.009  (0.021) 
COdomGPonly t-1  -0.022  (0.011)**  0.020  (0.023)  -0.011  (0.020) 
GPnonCO t-1  0.004  (0.008)  0.000  (0.009)  0.015  (0.011) 
R&DIN t-1  0.398  (0.124)***  0.610  (0.167)***  0.511  (0.223)** 
R&DEX t-1  0.071  (0.275)  0.322  (0.680)  1.131  (1.195) 
MAC t-1  0.105  (0.078)  0.142  (0.129)  0.251  (0.153) 
ROEK t-1  0.251  (0.345)  -0.572  (0.694)  -0.496  (0.873) 
PATt-1  0.030  (0.010)***  0.006  (0.011)  0.026  (0.011)** 
EXPORT t-1  0.020  (0.007)***  0.043  (0.010)***  0.018  (0.011)* 
SIZE t-1  0.006  (0.007)  -0.013  (0.010)  0.002  (0.006) 
CISw3  0.068  (0.056)  0.098  (0.033)***  0.070  (0.026)*** 
CISw4  0.028  (0.007)***  0.027  (0.011)**  0.016  (0.014) 
HT  0.052  (0.023)**  0.046  (0.029)  0.128  (0.038)*** 
MHT  0.022  (0.014)  0.044  (0.023)*  0.086  (0.027)*** 
MLT  0.039  (0.014)***  0.017  (0.019)  0.051  (0.029)* 
LT  0.034  (0.012)***  0.042  (0.020)**  0.051  (0.021)** 
KIS  0.026  (0.011)**  0.016  (0.016)  0.027  (0.016) 
Number of observations  2,586  1,338  1,404 
Number of firms  2,565  1,273  1,222 
σ (e)  0.436  (0.137)***  0.403  (0.046)***  0.429  (0.016)*** 
Wald 
2  286.40  255.39  290.93 
Log-likelihood  -1,155.175  -617.429  -676.224 
 
Note: Marginal effects reported; for binary variables the marginal effects refer to discrete change from 0 to 1; 




Overall, the big picture that comes out from these results is that domestic linkages rule. In 
other  words,  the  capacity  to  build  on  domestic  linkages  is  what  pays  off  most  for  the 
innovation output. Admittedly, this confirms the notion that international business does not 
undermine the role of local innovation systems (Narula 2003). Quite the contrary in fact tends 
to be the outcome of globalization of production and technology (Maskell and Malmberg 
1999, Rugman and D’Cruz 2003). Even if  firms  invest  and cooperate  abroad to  tap into 
foreign sources of tacit knowledge (Chesnais 1992, Cantwell 1995), their strategic capabilities 
remain embedded in local innovation systems. Pavitt and Patel (1991) and Patel and Vega 
(1999)  conclusions  on  “non-globalization”  of  core  technological  competencies  appear  as 
relevant as ever. 
 
Nevertheless, cooperation on innovation jointly with domestic and foreign partners, in other 
words combining local and global linkages, leads to superior innovation performance too, 
especially in small and open Czech and Norwegian economies. Here the results concord with 
the arguments aired by Bathelt et al. (2004) on the key role of interactions between learning 
processes taking place among actors embedded in the “local buzz” and knowledge obtained 
by building “global pipelines” to sources outside of the local milieu, because exactly the co-
existence of high levels of buzz and many pipelines provides firms with a string of particular 
advantages not available to outsiders. Hence, foreign external linkages are valuable but only 
in combination with the domestic ones. 
 
Furthermore, the positive effect of domestic cooperation appears to be driven by linkages to 
education, research and scientific institutions. Even though firms cooperate on innovation 
with these types of partners, especially universities and government labs, less frequently than 
say with their suppliers and customers, as well-known in the existing literature on this topic 
(Srholec 2010), these partners come out to be particularly valuable for boosting the innovation 
output. Arguably, this finding is encouraging for the literature in the tradition of Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff (2000) that puts emphasis on the role of industry-university relations in the 
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